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FACTORS DETERMINING THE DEGREE OF
CULPABILITY NECESSARY FOR VIOLATION OF
THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS IN
INFORMATION TRANSMISSION CASES
DAVID

S. RUDiER*

Recent developments have raised serious questions concerning the
standards of conduct required of various persons under the federal
securities laws. This article discusses certain factors which affect the
duties and liabilities of individuals who are involved directly or indirectly with the preparation of information and its transmission to the
public,' concluding that the factors to be considered in determining
whether a defendant's state of mind justifies imposition of civil liability or injunction should include: the likelihood that plaintiff has relied upon the defendant; the defendant's remoteness from the plaintiff's investment decision; the benefit which may accrue to the defendant; the defendant's occupation; the nature of the proceeding in
which violation of the law is being asserted; and the effect upon
securities law disclosure goals.
State of Mind - Recent Decisions
As Rule 10b-5, 2 the primary vehicle for imposing securities law
fraud obligations, has expanded in importance, the difficulties of
analysis have also grown. In the crucial area of the degree of culpability necessary to support liability, developments have reached an extremely important stage. Under today's complicated analysis, the
approach which a court takes in evaluating a defendant's state of
*Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law, Chicago, Illinois. B.A.
(1951), Williams College; J.D. (1957), University of Wisconsin.
'The communication of this information may take place in press releases, required
filings under the federal securities laws, proxy solicitations, reports to stockholders,
press releases or other public communications.
217 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974).
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mind may be of decisive importance. In cases involving information
transmission, the state of mind question may be phrased either in
terms of negligence or in terms of duty of inquiry as follows:
1. Will the defendant be liable for negligence in transmitting
misleading information to the public?
2. Did the defendant owe a duty to make inquiry at the time
misleading information was transmitted by him or others to the public?
The above questions have been considered directly or indirectly
in several recent cases. The Second Circuit recently held in Lanza v.
Drexel & Co.3 that an outside director need not answer in damages
for failure to make detailed inquiries regarding documents transmitted to others in connection with his corporation's unregistered securities transactions. In SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd.,4 the same court held in
an action for injunction that a lawyer has a duty to search out underlying facts when rendering an opinion which has the effect of permitting unregistered securities to be sold. In White v. Abrams,I the Ninth
Circuit recently declared that a flexible standard varying with the
relationships between the parties should govern obligations under
Rule 10b-5. The Second Circuit has also recognized that the relationship involved may affect the standard of culpability, stating in
Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc.' that the existence of privity of contract may "bear heavily" on the appropriate standard.
Most recently the United States Supreme Court has granted a
petition for a writ of certiorari in Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst,7 a case
decided by the Seventh Circuit involving an attempt to impose liability upon an accountant because of the accountant's failure to make
adequate investigation. The case involves significant questions regarding the state of mind necessary to support liability under the
federal securities laws.
Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst' was preceded by several other cases
in the Seventh Circuit involving the fraud of Leston B. Nay. Nay,
president of a broker-dealer firm, First Securities Company of Chicago, had induced friends and customers of his firm to invest funds
in a fictitious escrow account, promising to pay them substantial
3479 F.2d 1277, 1309 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc).
'489 F.2d 535, 541-42 (2d Cir. 1973).
1495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974).
'478 F.2d 1281, 1300 (2d Cir. 1973) (suit under Securities Exchange Act § 14(a)
for proxy rule violations).
7503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. granted,43 U.S.L.W. 3545 (U.S. Apr. 14, 1975)
(No. 74-1042).
31d.
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amounts in interest each year. Nay appropriated the funds for his
own use and finally committed suicide.'
The first of the two early opinions involving Nay's activities, SEC
v. First Securities Co. of Chicago,'" created significant uncertainty
with regard to the duties of persons remote from securities transactions through its statement that liability may be founded on "less
than actual knowledge and participation in the activity proscribed by
section 10 and Rule 10b-5. '" The latter statement was repeated and
amplified in Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exchange, 2 in which the
Seventh Circuit dealt with a claim that the Midwest Stock Exchange
should have discovered Nay's fraud. In suing Midwest, plaintiff alleged that the exchange failed to fulfill two separate obligations: 1) a
duty to make inquiry regarding the activities of member firms; and
2) a duty to take action once information about a member firm's
fraud was known. The court was asked to find that Midwest, which
had no actual knowledge of Nay's fraud, should be charged with
constructive knowledge of that fraud and be held liable for its inaction. The Seventh Circuit stated that the issues were whether Midwest had fulfilled its duty as a national securities exchange under
Section 6 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and whether Midwest had aided and abetted Nay's fraud by action or inaction.' 2.' It
held that Midwest had satisfied its duty of inquiry, finding in favor
of Midwest on both issues and stating the following:
[A]s our analysis of Midwest's. section 6 duty of selfregulation demonstrates, Midwest adequately satisfied its
duty of inquiry and had no reason to know of or suspect Nay's
'In the first of five Seventh Circuit decisions involving hig suicide, SEC v. First
Securities Co., 463 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972), the court

dealt with an appeal from the disallowance of claims by fifteen persons against First
Securities Company in receivership proceedings following Nay's death. The court of
appeals reversed a district court finding which had denied the escrow investors' claims.
A second Seventh Circuit opinion involving Nay's fraud,*also entitled SEC v. First
Securities Co., 466 F.2d 1035 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied 409 U.S. 1041 (1972) involved
Nay's swindle of Arnold Schueren. Over the yeaps Nay had pledged or sold securities
of Schueren for his own purposes while continuing to send Schueren bogus safe-keeping
receipts and "dividend checks" purportedly relating to those securities. The Seventh
Circuit held that Schueren was properly a claimant against First Securities Company
even though the fraud had not been conducted formally through First Securities. A
fifth decision recently dealt with the priorities of various claimants against the assets
of First Securities. See SEC v. First Securities Co., 507 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1974).
'463 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972).
"463 F.2d at 987. For an earlier analysis and discussion of S.E.C. v. First Securities
Co., see Horwich &Ruder, Seventh Circuit Review - SecuritiesLaw, 50 CHI.-KFr L.
REV. 362, 377-79 (1973).

"503 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 875 (1974).
1'503

F.2d at 367, 374.
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fraudulent escrow scheme. Failing proof that Midwest knew or
should have known of Nay's fraud we need not further our
of a claim for aiding and abetinquiry into the other elements
3
ting solely by inaction.
Following the Seventh Circuit's decision in Hochfelder v. Midwest
Stock Exchange, the Supreme Court declined to issue a writ of certiorari sought by the plaintiff. 4
Subsequent to its Midwest Stock Exchange decision, the Seventh
Circuit held in Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst 5 that the accountant
charged with making examination of the books and records of First
Securities had not necessarily satisfied duties of inquiry which it
owed under Section 17(a) and Rule 17a-5 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.18 Again, a writ of certiorari was sought from the United
States Supreme Court, in this instance by the accountant defendant
rather than by the plaintiff Hochfelder. In its brief seeking the writ,
Ernst & Ernst emphasized that the Seventh Circuit had expressed
willingness to impose liability upon the accountant to a remote group
of investors because of its alleged failure to make adequate investigation. It advanced the contention that a split between circuit courts
with regard to whether a defendant could be held liable for negligence
under the securities laws was a primary reason why a petition should
be granted. This time the Supreme Court granted the petition.
In reviewing Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst17 the Supreme Court can
be expected to center upon the statement of the Seventh Circuit
contained in both the Midwest and Ernst & Ernst decisions that:
[Wie are not prepared to hold that a claim for aiding and
abetting solely by inaction cannot be made under Rule 10b-5.
In invoking such a rule, however, we would not go so far as to
charge a party with aiding and abetting who somehow unwittingly facilitated the wrongful acts of another. Rather, to invoke such a rule investors must show that the party charged
with aiding and abetting had knowledge of or, but for a breach
of duty of inquiry, should have had knowledge of the fraud,
and that possessing such knowledge the party failed to act due
to an improper motive or breach of a duty of disclosure."
In both the Midwest and Ernst & Ernst phases of the Hochfelder
cases, the Seventh Circuit expressed its willingness to impose liabil11503 F.2d at 374-75.

1"419 U.S. 875 (1974).

15503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3545 (U.S. Apr. 14,
1975) (No. 74-1042).
"It remanded the case to the district court for a trial on the facts. 503 F.2d at 1119.
1See note 7 supra.
"1503 F.2d at 374; see 503 F.2d at 1104.
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ity upon defendants in securities law cases based upon failure of a
duty of investigation and failure to take action once information is
known.
State of Mind - Analysis
For purposes of analysis, several categories relating to state of
mind may be considered:
1. Deliberate conduct exists when the defendant has an intent to injure others.
2. Knowing conduct exists when the defendant acts with the
knowledge that his acts may injure others. Knowing conduct
would include knowing misrepresentation or nondisclosure.
3. Reckless conduct exists when the defendant acts in conscious disregard of, or indifference to, the risk that others will
be misled. This conduct includes what is sometimes referred
to as "gross negligence."
4. Negligent conduct exists when the defendant acts unreasonably but does not act with conscious disregard of consequences.
5. Innocent conduct exists when the defendant cannot reasonably be expected to know the true facts. 9
Although the above distinctions represent many years of accumulated common law analysis, they nevertheless have failed to provide
the required degree of predictability under the federal securities laws.
Perhaps because of the many variables available, the federal circuit
courts of appeals are widely split regarding the state of mind required
to establish liability.
In the Second Circuit "proof of a willful or reckless disregard for
the truth is necessary to establish liability under Rule 10b-5."20 The
Fifth Circuit has recently agreed with the Second Circuit's position,
stating that "some culpability beyond mere negligence is required for
liability under 10b-5."I'The Tenth Circuit also agrees that something
in addition to negligence is required:
[T]his court has repeatedly declined to extend the [federal
securities] acts to cases of simple negligence not involving
some fraudulent purpose or species of scienter within their
"Ruder & Cross, Limitations on Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5, 1972 DUKE L.J.
1125, 1140 (footnote omitted).
2OLanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1306 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc) (footnote
omitted).
"iVohs v. Dickson, 495 F.2d 607, 622 (5th Cir. 1974), citing Smallwood v. Pearl
Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 606 (5th Cir. 1974), and Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d

750, 761 (5th Cir. 1974).
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scope and purpose.Y
Despite the position of the Second, Fifth and Tenth Circuits requiring some culpability beyond negligence, other Circuits have
determined that negligence will support Rule 10b-5 liability. The
Eighth Circuit reached this conclusion relatively long ago2 and most
recently, the Seventh Circuit stated in Tomera v. Galt24 that "Rule
10b-5 claimants need not prove nor plead scienter."
The split between those circuits holding that something beyond
negligence is required in order to establish liability under Rule 10b-5
and those circuits holding that Rule 10b-5 claimants need only prove
negligence is emphasized by the middle ground positions of other
2
circuits. In Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades,'
the Third Circuit recently stated that it has "never been faced squarely" with the scienter question, and indicated that it would not rush to rule on the
problem.Y In White v. Abrams,21 the Ninth Circuit, which has long
been thought to have adopted negligence as a standard because of its
statements in Ellis v. Carter9 and Royal Air Propertiesv. Smith,"
2

1Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351, 1362 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W.
3659 (June 16, 1975). See also Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1974): "When
liability is to be imposed on participants, aiders and abettors, and co-conspirators
knowing participation in the fraudulent scheme must be shown." Id. at 554.
nVanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233, 1239 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852
(1970); accord, City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221, 230 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970).
21511 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1975).
'Id. at 508. In its Tomera decision, the Seventh Circuit did not specifically define
the term "scienter," but it apparently meant to adopSt a negligence standard for Rule
10b-5 liability. The court referred to Parrent v. Midwest Rug Mills, Inc., 455 F.2d 123
(7th Cir. 1972), in which it had utilized a negligence standard in selecting a statute of
limitations under Rule 10b-5 and which in turn had relied upon the Eighth Circuit's
decision in Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852
(1970). Tomera also noted Vanderboom's reliance upon Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270
(9th Cir. 1961), to sustain the Eighth Circuit's negligence standard of scienter. The
Seventh Circuit's Tomera decision also referred to Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 461
F.2d 11 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 925 (1972), with a "Cf." citation, apparently
intending to establish that the Dasho implication that scienter might be required in
regard to directors' liability was not consistent with the Tomera decision. 511 F.2d at
509.
26491 F.2d 402, 407 (3d Cir. 1973).
nThe Rochez Bros. court did, however, find that actual knowledge of the fraudulent misrepresentation would be sufficient scienter, reserving the question of the adequacy of recklessness for a later decision. 491 F.2d at 402, 407. See also Fenstermacher
v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 333, 340 (3d Cir. 1974).
-495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974).
2291 F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961), cited in, e.g., Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d
1233, 1239 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970).
30312 F.2d 210, 212 (9th Cir. 1962), cited in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d 833, 854 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).

1975]

CULPABILITY IN 10b-5 CASES

recently rejected concentration on labels and adopted its flexible
duty concept, stating:
[T]he court should. . . require the jury to consider the relationship of the defendant to the plaintiff, the defendant's access to the information as compared to the plaintiff's access,
the benefit that the defendant derives from the relationship,
the defendant's awareness of whether the plaintiff was relying
upon their relationship in making his investment decisions
and the defendant's activity in initiating the securities trans31 action in question.
The split between circuits regarding the state of mind question
has naturally created uncertainty with regard to the standard to be
used in imposing liability. Most frequently the question will be
phrased as whether. a defendant will be liable to a particular plaintiff
or class of plaintiffs for negligence.32 The answer may well depend
upon the relationships between the parties. Although the flexible
duty standard of White v. Abrams is subject to criticism because of
its failure to provide better guidelines for conduct, its concentration
upon the relationships between parties appears to be correct.2 "
Relationship Between PartiesAs a Relevant Consideration
In the context of an action based upon transmission of misleading
information, the parties may be relatively close to or relatively remote from each other. In some situations information will be trans'Id. at 735-36 (footnotes omitted). The court applied its flexible duty standard in
Marx v. Computer Sciences Corp., 507 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1974), a case involving
earnings forecasts which reversed a summary judgment granted in favor of the defendants because it was not clear that the defendants had met their duties imposed under
Rule 10b-5. Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has made it clear that
its White v. Abrams opinion permits liability to be imposed for negligence. See Robinson v. Cupples Container Co., 513 F.2d 1274 (9th Cir. 1975); Clark v. Watchie, 513 F.2d
994 (9th Cir. 1975).
3qn any event, it is virtually certain in all circuits that liability will be imposed
for something less than deliberate conduct.
32
-'See text accompanying note 31 supra.The White court suggested the following
rationale:
Where the defendant derives great binefit from a relationship of extreme trust and confidence with the plaintiff, the defendant knowing
that plaintiff completely relies upon him for information to which he
has ready access, but to which plaintiff has no access, the law imposes
a duty upon the defendant to use extreme care in assuring that all
material information is accurate and disclosed . . . . On the other
hand, where the defendant's relationship with the plaintiff is so casual
that a reasonably prudent person would not rely upon it in making
investment decisions, the defendant's only duty is not to misrepresent
intentionally material facts.
495 F.2d at 736.
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mitted for the purpose of inducing the plaintiff's reliance in a securities transaction or its equivalent. Such transactions may include
face-to-face purchase transactions, sales of securities by a corporation
or its controlling shareholders pursuant to a registration statement
under the Securities Act of 1933,11 or a corporate transaction which
requires a vote of shareholders and is the equivalent of a purchase or
sale. 34 In such transactions the corporation itself usually transmits
the information and will usually benefit from any misrepresentations.
In contrast, many purchase and sale transactions will take place in
the impersonal securities markets, remote from the person or corporation transmitting information.
One method of distinguishing between the types of transactions
involved is to ask whether the plaintiffs were engaged in a securities
transaction with the defendant. If a contractual relationship exists,
the relationship may be described as one of privity of contract. Even
when privity in the traditional sense does not exist, the relationship
may be close enough so that it is the equivalent of privity for Rule
10b-5 purposes.
Most courts currently hold that privity of contract is not an essential element for recovery. In doing so they have devoted little discussion to state of mind considerations, primarily because the defendants' conduct has clearly been highly culpable. 4" For instance, one
of the first cases declaring that privity of contract is not a required
element for recovery under Rule 10b-5, Cochran v. Channing Corp.,35
involved a deliberate scheme by corporate insiders to purchase minority shares by omitting a quarterly dividend in order to drive down
the market price. Another early case, Texas ContinentalLife Insurance Co. v. Bankers Bond Co., Inc.,36 involved sales of securities by
the wrongdoer to an intermediary who sold to a third party. The third
party was permitted to sue the original seller who had engaged in
knowing misrepresentations.
Two cases involving information transmission are consistent with
the proposition that elimination of privity has usually occurred in
cases of knowing or deliberate conduct. Heit v. Weitzen, 37 holding
U.S.C. § 77(a)-(aa) (1970).
SEC Rule 145, promulgated under the 1933 Act, now treats such transactions as
a sale, 17 C.F.R. 230.145 (1974). See also SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S.
453 (1969); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
970 (1967).
'"'For a general discussion balancing the factors of scienter, privity and the nature
of the fraud in terms of misrepresentation or nondisclosure, see Ruder, Texas Gulf
Sulphur-The Second Round: Privity and State of Mind in Rule 10b-5 Purchaseand
Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 423, 442-44 (1968).
31211 F. Supp. 239, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
36187 F. Supp. 14, 24-25 (W.D.Ky. 1960), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Texas
Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962).
37402 F.2d 909, 913 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969).
315
3
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that "[t]here is no necessity for contemporaneous trading in securities by insiders or by the corporation itself," involved misleading SEC
filings made intentionally in order to defraud the government in
transactions unrelated to plaintiffs' purchase transactions. Similarly
in Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,3" the court affirmed imposition of liability upon Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. for press releases characterized as intentionally misleading, even though the company had
not engaged in securities transactions.
The case which most clearly deals with the question whether the
characteristics of the securities transaction affect the obligation owed
is Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc.3" In that case, the Second Circuit
was faced with a proxy statement which had been used to solicit the
permission of shareholders for a corporate transaction in which their
interests in the corporation would be substantially changed. The
Gerstle court recognized that it had recently held in Lanza v. Drexel
& Co.4" that scienter is a required element for imposing liability under
Rule 10b-5 and sought to distinguish Rule 10b-5 from Rule 14a-9,
which governs proxy solicitation. It did so by emphasizing privity,
stating that:
[W]hile "privity" is not required for most actions under the
securities laws, its existence may bear heavily on the appropriate standard of culpability ....
11
Analyzing the particular transaction, the court noted that the required proxy statement "serves many of the same functions as a
registration statement" and, despite its Lanza decision, adopted a
negligence standard:
[A] broad standard of culpability here will serve to reinforce
the high duty of care owed by a controlling corporation to
minority shareholders in the preparation of a proxy statement
seeking their acquiescence ....
11
The Second Circuit's Gerstle decision seems to recognize that a
defendant's obligations may be affected by the nature of the transaction and in this regard seems to parallel the flexible duty standard
of the Ninth Circuit in White v. Abrams. 3 In other situations, the
-446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971).
3'478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973). The court in Gerstle was faced with a suit under
SEC Rule 14(a)(9), not Rule 10b-5. But the principles used by the court in determining
the standard under Rule 14(a)(9) usefully illustrate how the same analysis may be
applied to Rule 10b-5. Cf. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d
341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
"0479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
"1478 F.2d at 1300.

42Id.
-495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974).
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Second Circuit has indicated a willingness to assess culpability in
relation to the facts of the particular transaction. In Chris Craft Industries,Inc. v. PiperAircraft Corp.," a case involving an attempted
corporate acquisition and decided under Section 14(e), it stated:
The function of what has been called the "scienter" requirement is to confine the imposition of liability to those whose
conduct has been sufficiently culpable to justify the penalty
sought to be exacted. The initial inquiry in each case is what
duty of disclosure the law should impose upon the person being
sued.4 5
Subsequently, in Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc.," the Second Circuit interpreted its rule that those in possession
of material non-public corporate information must make appropriate
disclosure of that information or refrain from trading. The court
found that both trading and non-trading defendants knew that material revised earnings information was non-public." It denied a privity
defense and held the defendants liable to a class of purchasers in
anonymous market transactions."
Disclosure and FairnessConsiderations
In utilizing concepts of privity and state of mind to determine
liability in connection with information transmission, a court will be
required to determine whether its policy choices will achieve good
results with regard to both fairness and disclosure policy. 49 In the SEC
"480 F.2d 341, (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973). The Chris-Craftcase
was a private damage action involving fraud in defeating an attempted takeover of
Piper through a tender offer by Chris-Craft. The court generally followed principles
developed under Rule 10b-5 to formulate the elements of a claim under § 14(e) of the
Securities Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970). 480 F.2d at 362.
151d. at 363 (citations omitted).
4495

F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).

'7 d. at 238.
"However, in recognition of the possibility of "Draconian liability," the circuit
court left "the fashioning of appropriate relief, including the proper measure of damages" to the district court. Id. at 242. But cf. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 516 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1975) (Section 14(e) action; damages assessed at $26
million plus prejudgment interest).
"In Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,404 U.S.
1004 (1971), the court found that the company's press release was intentionally misleading and as a result it held the corporate defendant liable to purchasers who relied
upon that representation, even though the company itself had not engaged in securities
transactions. See also Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474
F.2d 514 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973) (timing of release of adverse
financial report is a matter of corporate discretion; defendant exercised good faith and
due diligence in disclosing information, so not liable under Rule 10b-5).
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injunctive proceeding, S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,5" Judge
Friendly raised both problems by questioning whether a corporation
issuing a negligent press release should be liable to persons engaged
in anonymous market transactions. He emphasized the negative aspects by stating:
The consequences of holding that negligence in the drafting of
a press release . . . may impose civil liability on the corporation are frightening. 1
In the subsequent Gerstle52 decision, Judge Friendly expressed his
concern regarding disclosure policy. After concluding that proof of
negligence is sufficient to impose liability upon a corporation which
uses a misleading proxy, Judge Friendly referred to Rule 10b-5 cases
and indicated that if privity or its equivalent were absent in information transmission cases, the court would not utilize such a high standard:
[M]any 10b-5 cases relate to statements issued by corporations, without legal obligation to do so, as a result of what the
SEC has properly called "a commendable and growing recognition on the part of industry and the investment community
of the importance of informing security holders and the public
generally with respect to important business and financial developments." . . . Imposition of too liberal a standard with
respect to culpability would deter this, particularly in light of
-401 F.2d 833, 866 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (Friendly, J., concurring), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969).
11401 F.2d at 866. He continued:
As has been well said, of a situation where time pressures and consequent risks were less, "One source of perplexity as to the appropriate
bounds of the civil remedy for misleading filings is that any remedy
imposed against the issuer itself is indirectly imposed on all holders
of the common stock, usually the most important segment of the total
category of investors intended to be protected." Milton Cohen, Truth
in Securities Revisited, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1340, 1370 (1967). Beyond
this, a rule imposing a civil liability in such cases would work directly
counter to what the SEC has properly called "a commendable and
growing recognition on the part of industry and the investment community of the importance of informing security holders and the public
generally with respect to important business and financial developments." Securities Act Interpretation Release No. 3844 (Oct. 8, 1957).
If the only choices open to a corporation are either to remain silent
and let false rumors do their work, or to make a communication, not
legally required, at the risk that a slip of the pen or failure properly
to amass or weigh the facts-all judged in the bright gleam of
hindsight-will lead to large judgments, payable in the last analysis
by innocent investors, for the benefit of speculators and their lawyers,
most corporations would opt for the former.
Id. at 866-67.
"Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973).

582

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

the almost unlimited liability that may result ....

[Vol. XXXII
3

Judge Adams of the Third Circuit also expressed concern regarding
fairness in his dissent in Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc.:"
It is fitting that in the face-to-face confrontations, courts
should impose a higher standard of disclosure by lessening the
degree of culpability upon which liability can be imposed.
From a practical standpoint, in such situations, the amount of
damages in relatively finite, whereas in a suit on behalf of a
class composed of thousands of shareholders, damages might
well extend into millions of dollars. When faced with such huge
potential payments, the brunt of which will be borne by innocent shareholders of the defendant corporation, the courts
seem to have proceeded more slowly, by requiring that the
plaintiff class prove conduct closer to the traditional concepts
55
of actionable fraud.
Reliance and Foreseeabilityas FactorsInfluencing Results
The theory that liability for transmitting misrepresentations to
the investing public may depend upon the relationship between those
transmitting and those receiving the information may also be expressed in terms of reliance and foreseeability. In all instances it can
be expected that those transmitting corporate information will reasonably foresee that individuals receiving the information will rely
upon it. Reliance may exist in an individual transaction, such as a
face-to-face securities purchase, or a loan transaction. It may also
3Id. at 1300 (citations omitted).
54458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972).
mId. at 286. Similarly the SEC recognized in a recent amicus brief that motive and
benefit are relevant to recovery when liability is asserted against a corporation in nonprivity transactions:
Although there are strong public policies that militate in favor of
imposing liability upon a corporation for the acts of its officers and
authorized agents, a court may well be concerned that the wrongful
acts of officers in violation of Rule 10b-5 not expose the shareholders
of a publicly-owned corporation to undue liability. Of course no reason
exists, either in equity or in the objectives of the federal securities
laws, to permit a corporation to retain profits or any other forms of
benefits it may have derived from the wrongful acts of its officers or
agents. But where the corporation has not benefitted, the courts may
find it equitable, and consistent with the basis upon which a right of
action has been implied under Rule 10b-5, to limit an award of damages against it.
Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae in Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit at 27-28, Manor Drug
Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1974), reversed, 95 S. Ct. 1917
(1975). The text of this article was completed prior to the Supreme Court's Blue Chip
Stamps opinion.
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exist when a group of persons rely upon information in specific transactions, such as the purchase of securities pursuant to a registration
statement or a proxy oriented corporate transaction. Larger groups
may also rely when engaging in purchase or sale transactions in the
impersonal securities markets. Examination of expected reliance in
terms of foreseeability may assist in identifying the appropriate standard.
As with other areas of development under Rule 10b-5, it may be
useful to turn to common law parallels to determine the standards
which should be employed. One readily available source of common
law comparison is the law relating to accountants' liabilities. 6 Accountants' cases offer particularly useful concepts because in performing public auditing and certification functions accountants ac57
cept a degree of responsibility for reliable information transmission.
The reliance element is also present, since the individual accountant
usually can foresee that his certificate regarding financial information will be relied upon by others in investment and commercial
transactions."
For purposes of analogy to federal securities law problems, the
significant question is whether an accountant will be liable for misrepresentations made and relied upon by the investing public. 9 In this
regard, the significant starting point is that privity of contract nor"If the accountant is employed merely to "write-up" the books of the client, he
normally accepts the client's records as being correct and has no obligation to make
further investigation. The question of an accountant's obligation to engage in audit
activities when employed only for "write-up" purposes has created substantial controversy in the accounting profession. See 1136 Tenants' Corp. v. Max Rothenberg &
Co., 36 App. Div.2d 804, 319 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (1971), motion to dismiss appeal denied,
28 N.Y.2d 991, 323 N.Y.S.2d 844 (1971), afrd. mem., 30 N.Y.2d 585, 281 N.E.2d 846,
330 N.Y.S.2d 800 (1972).
"In contrast to write-up services, audit services require the accountant to test the
reliability of a client's records as well as internal controls. See generally, Statements
on Auditing Standards,Auditing StandardsExecutive Committee, AmericanInstitute
of Certified Public Accountants, CCH AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, AU § 100
(1974). An accountant's duties of inquiry do not ordinarily include an obligation to
discover theft or defalcations:
[Tihe ordinary examination directed to the expression of an opinion
on financial statements is not primarily or specifically designed, and
cannot be relied upon, to disclose defalcations and other similar irregularities ....
Auditing Standards Executive Committee (AICPA), Statements on Auditing

Standards, CCH AICPA

PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS,

AU § 110.05 (1974).

"If an accountant certified a client's financial statement he represents not only
that an audit has been conducted, but also that the financial information has been
presented in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. See generally
Accepted Accounting Principles-PervasivePrinciples, CCH AICPA Professional
STANDARDS, AC § 1026 (1974).
"An accountant's liability to his client for failure to perform his engagement
properly will normally be imposed under contract principles. For instance an accoun-
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mally will not exist, i.e., the accountant will not have entered into a
contractual relationship with the investor who is relying upon his
accounting statement. In that situation an accountant making a consciously false misrepresentation will be liable at common law to all
persons who reasonably rely upon the misrepresentation even though
privity of contract does not exist. This principle is set forth in proposed § 531 of the Restatement of Torts:
One who makes a fraudulent misrepresentation is subject to
liability for pecuniary loss
(a) to the persons or class of persons whom he intends or has
reason to expect to act or refrain from action in reliance upon
the misrepresentation; and
(b) for pecuniary loss suffered by them through their reliance
in the type of transaction in which he intends or has reason to
expect their conduct to be influenced. 0
For this purpose the Restatement's term "fraudulent" means "consciously false,""1 so the standard is still a high one.
The more difficult question is whether accountants should be liable for misrepsentations which are negligently or recklessly made.
UltramaresCorp. v. Touchel2 presented this problem in an action for
damages suffered because of negligent misrepresentations by accountants. The court denied liability for negligence with the much quoted
statement that such liability might "expose accountants to a liability
in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class." 3 In State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst & Ernst,64 the court
imposed liability upon accountants who recklessly prepared corporate financial statements upon which a lender relied. This case involved recklessness which can be equated with knowing conduct. 5
on time. L. B. Laboratories, Inc. v. Mitchell, 39 Cal.2d 56, 59, 244 P.2d 385, 389 (1952).
Liability may also be imposed in tort in favor of the client. Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d
395 (Iowa 1969) (affirmative representations that the payables had been confirmed
when they had not been confirmed); Stanley L. Bloch, Inc. v. Klein, 45 Misc. 2d 1054,
258 N.Y.S.2d 501 (S.Ct. 1965) (representation that the financial statement was audited
when it was not). With regard to third party liability, see Fiflis, Current Problems of
Accountants' Responsibilitiesto Third Parties,28 VAN. L. REv. 31 (1975).
"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 531 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
1RESTATEMENT OF ToRrs, Explanatory Notes § 552, comment 8 at 98 (Tent. Draft
No. 10, 1964).
62255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
"255 N.Y. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444.
6278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d 416 (1938).
"See discussions of the differences and similarities between knowledge and recklessness in Ruder & Cross, Limitationson Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5, 1972 DUKE
L.J. 1125, 1140. In the context of alleged securities fraud, some courts have suggested
that awareness of facts suggesting deception or fraud raises a duty of inquiry. Failure
to inquire further may amount to recklessness. See, e.g., Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479
F.2d 1277, 1306 n.98 (2d Cir. 1973).
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Both the Ultramaresand State Street Trust cases involved identification of the persons who will foreseeably rely upon the financial
statements. In Ultramaresthe foreseeable group was large and indefinite. In the State Street Trust case the lender was an easily identified
person whom the accountant could have reasonably foreseen would
rely upon the financial statement.
A third illustrative case, Ryan v. Kanne," involved 'negligence
rather than recklessness or intentional conduct and raised directly
the question whether an accountant could be liable for negligence in
non-privity transactions. The court imposed liability upon an accountant who negligently prepared a misleading financial report
knowing both the identity of the non-privity plaintiff and the plaintiff's intent to rely on the report in purchasing stock. In imposing
liability, the court emphasized the "strength of the proposition that
an accountant should be liable in negligence for careless financial
misrepresentation relied upon by actually foreseen and limited
classes of persons." 6 Nevertheless it expressly noted that liability for
negligence should not extend to "all foreseeable persons who may rely
upon the report."6
This common law emphasis upon foreseeability was recently analyzed by the Seventh Circuit in Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst,6" discussed above. In that case the court held that the accountant was not
liable under common law to a broad class of investors for negligent
conduct. The court identified two groups of persons to whom the
accountant might be liable for negligence. It first described the "foreseen plaintiff" as follows:
[Those third persons, whose potential reliance on the financial statements was specifically known to the accountant
70

It then identified the "foreseeable plaintiff":
[Tlhose who, although not themselves foreseen, are members
of a limited class whose reliance on the financial statements is
specifically foreseen.71
The court indicated that persons falling outside of these groups were
not entitled to recover under common law theories.
This identification of groups based upon foreseeability recognizes
8170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969).
7
1d. at 402. See also RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (Tent. Draft No. 12,
1966).
"170 N.W.2d at 403.
"1503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3545 (U.S. Apr. 14,
1975) (No. 74-1042).
11503 F.2d at 1107.
7id.
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that the concepts of reliance and foreseeability are relative and subject to policy judgments. Clearly an accountant can foresee that financial statements bearing his certificate will be widely relied upon by
persons making investment decisions. Despite this fact, common law
courts have limited liability for negligent conduct by drawing lines
which recognize the potential unfairness of imposing immense damages for negligence. These lines are indistinct, but nevertheless useful, since at some point potential plaintiffs are so remote from the
accountant and so numerous that negligent but good faith conduct
should not give rise to liability.
From the federal securities law viewpoint the common law accountants' cases thus seem to confirm a trend in information transmission cases by which liability may depend upon the interrelationship between the defendant's state of mind and privity, with the
latter related in turn to reliance, foreseeability, and securities law
policy. Since information transmitted by a corporation or others will
be relied upon by individuals in making investment decisions, similar
problems exist in identifying the particular circumstances in which
liability for negligence should be placed upon those involved in the
transmission of information.
Duty of Inquiry
Analysis may be further advanced by phrasing the negligence
question in terms of a duty of inquiry, again referring to accountants'
duties by way of illustration. For instance, under some circumstances, an accountant may be subject to liability for failure to make the
inquiries required under AICPA auditing standards.72 Assuming he
has attempted to comply with his responsibilities, his conduct is in
good faith and if actionable falls into the negligence category.
In the securities law context, an accountant's duty of inquiry to a
non-privity class can be illustrated by Section 11 of the Securities Act
of 1933. Section 11(a) (4) of that Act imposes liability for untrue statements of certain material facts made in a registration statement upon
"every accountant . . .who has with his consent been named as
73
having prepared or certified any part of the registration statement.
In dealing with state of mind, Section 11 provides a defense for an
accountant to the effect that he will not be liable if
he had, after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to
72
The accountant may not be protected even if he has complied with GAAP. See
United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970);
Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
1115 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(4) (1970).
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believe and did believe, at the time such part of the registra- r
tion statement became effective, that the statements therein
were true and that there was no omission to state a material
fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the
statements therein not misleading . .. .
This defense imposes a duty of inquiry upon the accountant and has
the effect of creating liability for negligent failure to fulfill that duty.75
Section 11 exemplifies the 1933 Act's policy of imposing special
obligations depending on the nature of the transaction. It extends
liability for negligence to a class of purchasers who have no contractual relationship to the accountant. Liability is imposed for negligent
breach of a duty of inquiry in this non-privity setting because the
accountant's participation is essential to the issuer, which in turn
obtains benefit from the sale of its securities.
Duty of Inquiry in the Aiding and Abetting Setting
A degree of confusion relating to state of mind under the federal
securities laws has recently been introduced through the doctrine of
aiding and abetting. As may be expected with any relatively new
doctrine, courts have been imprecise in its application. Currently,
most questions in the aiding and abetting context are arising in actions seeking damages or injunction for breach of a duty of inquiry.
As analyzed above, duty of inquiry is an aspect of negligence. If a
court grants damages or injunctive relief in the information transmission context, it will do so because the defendant has breached his
duty of inquiry with regard to transmitted information, not because
the defendant has aided another person's wrongful conduct. Nevertheless, since recent cases use aiding and abetting terminology, it is
useful to examine "duty of inquiry" concepts as they appear in aiding
and abetting cases."
The case which has given the greatest impetus to the current use
of aiding and abetting theory is Brennan v. Midwestern United Life
InsuranceCo.71 In that case the trial court found that Michael Dobich
7'15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(B)(i) (1970).

75The leading case interpreting the due diligence standard under § 11 is Escott v.

BarChris Constr. Co., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
7
'The following comments are based in part upon two articles by the author:
Aiding and Abetting Liability, 7 Review of Securities Regulation 882 (Sept. 4, 1974);

Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting,
Conspiracy,In Pari Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution,120 U. PA. L. REV. 597
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Ruder, Multiple Defendants].

71259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966) (motion to dismiss denied), 286 F. Supp. 702
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and Dobich Securities Corporation violated the securities laws by
dealing in a fraudulent manner with customers' money. Dobich accomplished his fraud by accepting orders and payments for stock of
Midwestern United Life Insurance Company and then using his customers' payments to speculate on the commodities market. Liability
was imposed upon Midwestern on the grounds that it knew that
Dobich was violating the securities laws and that it had actively
assisted him.
The district court in Brennan relied primarily upon § 876 of the
Restatement of Torts to impose liability upon the corporation. The
section provides in pertinent part:
876. Persons Acting in Concert
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, a person is liable if he
(a) orders or induces such conduct, knowing of the conditions under which the act is done or intending the consequences which ensue, or
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of
duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the
other so to conduct himself .... Is
Applying subsection (b), the court held that aiding and abetting
liability exists when the person giving substantial assistance to the
wrongdoer knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of
duty. " -' The circuit court, on appeal, substantially endorsed the district court's reasoning and opinion. 7s .2 This approach was followed in

Landy v. FederalDeposit Insurance Corporation:"
Three elements are thus required for liability:
(1) that an independent wrong exists; (2) that the aider or
abettor know of that wrong's existence; and (3) that substantial assistance be given in effecting that wrong.8"
Both Brennan and Landy seemed to require that the defendant
have knowledge of the wrongdoing before liability could be imposed.
Developments since those cases indicate that despite the statement
in Landy, some courts will be willing to impose "aiding and abetting"
liability if the defendant should have made inquiry which would have
alerted him to the fact that an independent wrong existed. It is this
(N.D. Ind. 1968) (on merits), aff'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
989 (1970).
78REsTATEMENT OF ToRTS § 876 (1939).
11'1286 F. Supp. at 717.
".'See 417 F.2d at 153-55.
7486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973).
81d. at 162-63.
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aspect of aiding and abetting that has created confusion and which
may have motivated the Supreme Court to review Hochfelder v.'
Ernst & Ernst.
As noted earlier, in Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exchange,," the
Seventh Circuit expressed a willingness to invoke liability under aiding and abetting doctrine based upon a breach of a duty of inquiry.
2 case it held that an accountant owed a duty
In the Ernst & Ernst"
of inquiry because of its obligations under Section 17(a) and Rule
17a-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which require brokers
and dealers to report their financial condition.
The Sixth Circuit's decision in S.E.C. v. Coffey, s' involving possible violations by corporate officials, illustrates concern with the duty
of inquiry, but reaches opposite results. There the court considered
duties under both aiding and abetting and primary liability doctrine.
It first stated:
Without meaning to set forth an inflexible definition of aiding
and abetting, we find that a person may be held as an aider
and abettor only if some other party has committed a securities law violation, if the accused party had general awareness
that his role was part of an overall activity that is improper,
and if the accused aider-abettor knowingly and substantially
assisted the violation."
Applying this aiding and abetting standard, the court refused to find
a violation by a corporate board chairman who did not have knowledge of wrongdoing. Likewise, applying primary liability theory, it
refused to place liability on him for failure to supervise his subordinates:
Imposing such a duty would effectively make corporate officials primarily liable for any securities law violation by a subordinate. It would disrupt corporate systems of delegation of
authority and accountability ....
In contrast, in SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd.,8" an injunction action, an
attorney was found to owe a duty to make inquiry. The action was
"1503 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 875 (1974).
1503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3545 (U.S.
Apr. 14, 1975) (No. 74-1042). See text accompanying notes 69-71 supra.
u493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3416 (U.S. Jan. 27, 1975)
(No. 74-661).
"Id. at 1316 (footnote omitted).
8Id. at 1315.
"489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973).
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brought on aiding and abetting theory, claiming that the attorney's
opinion letter was used to facilitate an illegal distribution of unregistered securities. The Second Circuit disagreed with the lower court's
holding that actual knowledge of the illegal scheme was required,
stating that a "negligence standard" was sufficient in an enforcement
proceeding. 7 The reversal amounted to a statement that an attorney
preparing an opinion which might facilitate an illegal distribution of
unregistered securities has a duty to make inquiry regarding the underlying facts before issuing his opinion.
The apparently conflicting results of the latter two injunction
cases may be explained on the basis that the alleged wrongdoers
occupied different positions. In Coffey the claim was that a board
chairman owed a duty of inquiry, while in Spectrum the holding was
that an attorney engaged in issuing an opinion which would be used
in a distribution of securities owed such an obligation. However, the
principle remains consistent: in some circumstances breach of a duty
of inquiry has been held to constitute a securities law violation.
As the foregoing analysis indicates, aiding and abetting violations
may depend upon whether the party alleged to have aided or abetted
the particular activity owes a duty of inquiry. However, since violations occur whenever the duty of inquiry is breached, "aiding and
abetting" is not the appropriate title. The violation consists of
breaching this primary duty, not in breaching a duty to refrain from
aiding a wrongdoer.
Duty to Take Action
Whether liability is "primary" or imposed for "aiding and abetting" it should also be noted that breach of the duty of inquiry alone
should not suffice as a basis for imposition of liability under the
securities laws. The alleged wrongdoer must have both a duty of
inquiry and a duty to take action based upon the knowledge which
should have been acquired.
For instance, in Lanza v. Drexel & Co.,88 the Second Circuit dealt
with the question whether a non-participating director owes a duty
to see that all material adverse information about his company is
conveyed to a prospective purchaser of his corporation's stock. The
court's opinion dealt with a "duty to convey," but failed to distinguish adequately between the twin duties, the duty to inquire and the
duty to take action. The court eventually held that the director did
"7Id. at 541.
-479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
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not breach his duty of inquiry, but it phrased much of its discussion
in terms of a duty to convey.89
Other recent cases demonstrate circumstances under which a
duty to take action exists once knowledge of wrongdoing is known.
For instance, in Kerbs v. Fall River Industries, Inc.," a corporate
president was held to have a duty to take action when he knew that
his subordinates were engaged in stock transactions in which other
parties to the transaction were not privy to certain information. In
Rosen v. Dick" a bank which had actual knowledge of a fraud and
intended to aid the wrongdoers was held to have violated Rule 10b-5
by its failure to take action.
The Beginnings of an OccupationalAnalysis: Directors' Duties
Thus far this article has suggested that when misleading information is transmitted to the public and becomes the basis for a claim
of liability the applicable policy considerations should include the
alleged wrongdoer's state of mind, the remoteness of the plaintiffs'
securities transaction and the desirability of encouraging accurate
and prompt disclosure of corporate information. Although these factors should always be important, it is also useful to ask whether
duties to inquire or to take action arise because of the alleged wrongdoer's occupation. This question has already been examined with
regard to accountants, who may owe special responsibilities when
they certify the accuracy of a corporation's financial statements.
Similar considerations apply to others who may have special responsibilities arising from their occupations or status. Recent cases dealing with the duties of directors illustrate the necessity of considering
the occupational factor carefully.
State law cases dealing with directors' liability for negligence have
tended to focus upon their responsibilities or obligations to their corporations rather than to the purchasers of securities. Interpretation
of directors' conduct in these circumstances may nevertheless be useful in analyzing information transmission cases. The duties of a director to his corporation are well-stated in the standard proposal for
revision of § 35 of the Model Business Corporation Act:9"
srThe fairly clear implication of both the majority and the minority opinions in
Lanza is that a director who has actual knowledge that his corporation was engaged
in a securities transaction based upon misleading misrepresentations would be under
a duty to convey the proper information to the other side of the transaction.
"502 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1974).
9CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,786 at 96,604 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
' 2Report of Committee on CorporateLaws: Changes in the Model Business Cor-
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A director shall perform his duties as a director, including his
duties as a member of any committee of the board upon which
he may serve, in good faith, in a manner he reasonably believes
to be in the best interests of the corporation, and with such
care as an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would
use under similar circumstances. 3
Under the standard articulated in proposed § 35 and in the common law cases, a director will not be liable to his corporation if he
has been diligent and does not have grounds to suspect wrongdoing. 4
The so-called business judgment rule has frequently been invoked to
the effect that an informed director will not be liable to his corporation for an honest mistake in judgment. 5 On the other hand, a director clearly has a duty to act diligently. Liability may be imposed
upon him if his corporation has been injured under circumstances in
which the director has failed to pay attention to corporate affairs and
could have prevented the harm."
If this policy has prevailed in cases involving director liability to
the corporation, it may also be reliable in determining whether a
director should be liable when his corporation transmits misleading
information. If a director is protected against errors in judgment in
connection with corporate management, one may ask whether the
same standard should not also be applicable with regard to his duties
in connection with information transmission. Significant questions
also exist as to whether these duties will be different if the director
or his corporation receives direct benefit from the information transmission.
Section 11 of the 1933 Act indicates that a director may be subject
to suit97 under the federal securities laws and that in certain circumstances9 he may also have due diligence duties similar to those of
accountants. Imposition of obligations in the registration statement
context makes sense in terms of the relationship test, since a director
knows that his company's prospectus will be used to influence persons to purchase securities from the corporation.
poration Act, 30 Bus. LAWS. 501 (1975).
"Id. at 502.
4E.g., Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 182 A.2d 328 (Ch.Del. 1962).
"5E.g., Bodell v. General Gas & Elec. Corp., 140 A. 264 (De. 1927).
"DePinto v. Landoe, 411 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1969); DePinto v. Provident Security
Life Ins. Co., 374 F.2d 37 (9th Cir. 1967).
0 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(2)-(3) (1970).
"815 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(A) (1970).
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Liability for negligence in information transmission has also been
imposed upon directors in a proxy suit involving § 14(a) of the 1934
Act in connection with a corporate transaction. In Gould v. American
HawaiianSteamship Co.," liability was imposed where the directors
knew that a corporate document was prepared for the purpose of
inducing a transaction with the corporation.
As noted earlier, a director's duty to inquire and subsequently to
convey information to prospective purchasers of his corporation's
stock was at issue in Lanza v. Drexel & Co. 10 The Lanza circumstances differ from the market transaction cases because the corporation
itself was engaged in a securities transaction. But the transaction was
also closer to a registered offering situation, since the corporation was
purchasing a business in exchange for its own stock. In an en banc
decision, the majority of the court stated that a standard of culpability greater than negligence would apply. In interpreting whether the
standard had been met the court quoted from an SEC amicus brief
indicating that directors have a right to rely on others in performing
their functions within the corporation, even in a securities transaction context:
Corporate directors are not normally involved in the dayto-day conduct of the company's affairs. Except in unusual
circumstances, they are not expected to, nor do they, participate directly in the implementation of corporate policies. Routine managerial tasks are performed by, and are the responsibility of, the operating officers. Directors have a right to rely
on the officers of the corporation to perform their functions in
a lawful manner.' 0'
The minority seemed to disagree with the majority, but an analysis of the minority opinions indicates that there may not have been
major differences in their viewpoints. No judge would have permitted
reckless avoidance of a duty to inquire.' Apparently all would have
imposed liability for failure to take action where warning signals are
"351 F. Supp. 853 (D. Del. 1972).
1-479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
1

MId.at 1306, quoting Brief of SEC as Amicus Curiae at 5, Lanza v. Drexel & Co.,
479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
'"One dissenting judge stated that a director should not be able to avoid his duties
"by failing to inform himself of the facts and developments relevant to the sale of
securities." Id. at 1317-18 (Hays, J., dissenting). Judge Hays' comment may merely
have been a statement that a good faith standard cannot be met merely by reliance
on others.
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present. 03
The statutes and cases cited relating to duties of directors suggest
that the directors' liability under the securities law will be affected
by both the state of mind and relationship factors discussed above
and by considerations applicable to his occupation or status. Under
Section 11 the duty of inquiry is high because directors bear responsibility for the issuance of securities. Likewise, where, as in Gould,
proxies are used to solicit votes in a corporate transaction, directors
also may have a duty of inquiry.' 4 Under circumstances similar to
those in Lanza, when a corporation is engaged in less formal securities
transactions, directors must make inquiries whenever suspicious circumstances exist, but they apparently have the right to rely upon
others.
Neither Gould nor Lanza involved an unlimited class of market
investors. The question of directors' duties to inquire with regard to
the normal flow of corporate information was not treated in those
cases. If Lanza is correct, however, directors should be able to protect
themselves from liability by well placed reliance on others.' 5

'1Two dissenting judges would have imposed iiability because of the director's
"reckless disregard for the truth." Id. at 1322 (Timbers & Oakes, J.J., dissenting).
"4But see U.S. v. Koenig, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,765 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), a
criminal case, as follows:
[E]xcept in the case of an SEC civil enforcement suit seeking injunctive relief, mere negligence by a corporate officer or director would not
appear sufficient to impose civil liability, and is certainly not sufficient to impose criminal liability.
Id. at 96,542.
"'One solution to the securities law problems may be found in § 18 of the 1934
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1970), which provides:
"Liability for Misleading Statements"
(a) Any person who shall make or cause to be made any statement
in any application, report, or document filed pursuant to this title or
any rule or regulation thereunder, or any undertaking contained in a
registration statement as provided in subsection (d) of section 15 of
this title, which statement was at the time and in the light of the
circumstances under which it was made false or misleading with respect to any material fact, shall be liable to any person (not knowing
that such statement was false or misleading) who, in reliance upon
such statement, shall have purchased or sold a security at a price
which was affected by such statement, for damages caused by such
reliance, unless the person sued shall prove that he acted in good faith
and had no knowledge that such statement was false or misleading ....
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The Nature of the Proceeding

The above discussion demonstrates that Rule 10b-5 principles
should be applied carefully and that results should depend upon the
particular circumstances involved. Likewise it is important to note
that standards may be different in Securities and Exchange Commission injunctive actions seeking prospective relief than they are in
private damage actions. These distinctions were articulated by Judge
Adams in his dissent in Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc."'8 as
follows:
Another distinction lies in the nature of the relief requested. Where the Government or a private party is seeking
prospective injunctive relief only, it is appropriate that courts
be able to protect the investors and shareholders from future
harm even though the conduct involved does not amount to
common law fraud. . . . On the other hand, when the plaintiff
class is seeking retrospective relief, such as substantial money
damages or dissolution of a merger, more serious problems
arise and a different balance must be struck. When the Act is
utilized retrospectively rather than prophylactically, the
courts must bear, in mind that the civil recovery provisions
were designed primarily as a "back-stop" for the criminal provisions, and that the Act operates essentially as a private penal
statute. Where the relief discourages conduct through punishment, whether by damages or by divestiture, it is altogether
proper, and indeed essential, for courts to cleave close to the
Congressional purpose by construing the statute strictly, and
to affix liability only where culpable conduct is made out.107
Conclusion
This article has identified various factors which may affect securities law liability for transmission of misleading corporate information, with special emphasis upon the state of mind, or culpability, of
the alleged wrongdoer." 8 These factors should be weighed carefully in
determining liability and in encouraging disclosure of corporate information. It may be hoped that if those charged with responsibility for
1'458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972).
1171d. at 286-87 (citations omitted).
'For a recent student discussion of the flexible duty standards, see Note, The
Development of a Flexible Duty Standard Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 32 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 99 (1975).
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making corporate disclosure can expect realistic evaluation of the
circumstances surrounding their activities, they will be encouraged
toward disclosure rather than being threatened into silence.

